Hospitality Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Hospitality Review Volume 25/Issue 1
January 2007

Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of
Debt in Multinational Restaurant Firms
Arun Upneja
The Pennsylvania State University, null@psu.edu

Michael C. Dalbor
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview
Part of the Food and Beverage Management Commons
Recommended Citation
Upneja, Arun and Dalbor, Michael C. (2007) "Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of Debt in Multinational Restaurant
Firms," Hospitality Review: Vol. 25 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol25/iss1/3

This work is brought to you for free and open access by FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hospitality Review by an
authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Article 3

Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of Debt in Multinational
Restaurant Firms
Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to understand whether multinational restaurant firms (MNRF’s) have higher
agency and expected bankruptcy costs. Given this expectation, this may have an impact on the amount of debt
incurred by MNRF’s. Overall, the findings are consistent with the existing literatue in terms of the positive
relationship between MNRF’s and agency and bankruptcy cost. However, it was found that MNRF’s also have
more total debt. This is surprising given the higher agency and bankruptcy costs. The importance of this
research is that there may be considerations other than agency and bacnkruptcy costs affecting the capital
structure decisions of MNRF’s.
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Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and the Use of Debt
in Multinational Restaurant Firms
By -4mn Upneja a n d Michael C. Dalbor
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Iiision $ A t W >.

Introduction
The purpose of this paper 1s to assess the relationship between agency costs, b a n h p t c y
costs and the use of debt in multinational restaurant fums (XINRF's). The underl!lng tradeoff is
between the benefits of international diversification against the expecred increases in agency and
bankruptcy costs from the use of debt.
This research represenrs a continuation of work done regarding capital structure.
Capital structure has been actively researched in the field of hnance since the seminal work of
Modigliani and Mtller (1938). More recendl-, a stream of research has begun in the field of
hospithty (Sheel, 1994; Kim, 1997; Dalbor and Upneja, 2004). However, much of the
hospitality Lterature in this area has focused primarily on domestic firms or has paid r e n little
attention to the multinational aspects of companies. International revenues are becoming more
important to the industry. McDonald's, for example, is a component of the Dow-Jones
Industrial Average and is one of the most well-known hospitality fums. In 2004, it derived more
than 65 percent of its total revenues from outside of the United States. ;\ccordingIy, the
significance of this research is that it extends an understandng of the factors that influence the
capital structure decision of hfNRF's.
One of the motivations for this research is to continue to investigate the lmk between
diversification benefits for multinational fums and capital structure. One theoq is that
multinational Grms invest in countries that are negatively correlated with the Cnited States,
initially lowering their risk. This subsequently alloms them to take on more debt. This
diversification benefit was confumed by early research conducted by Hughes, Logue and
SweeneJ-(1975). However, Reeb, Kurok and Baek (1998) find that multinational firms have
more risk. This may be from an increase in sysrematic risk due to extra cschange rate risk as
suggested by Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996). In terms of capital stmcture, Lee and Kwok
(1988) find chat multinational f m s use less debt than theit domestic counterparts. One reason
for investigating the capital structure of hfNRF's is to assess whether the benefits of
dmersification outweigh the extra agency monitoring costs in a multinational ern.ironrnent.
hfultinational f m s grow in different ways. hIany indusmal f m s will build and own
facilities overseas. This is not always the case for restaurants. As an example. Yum Corporation
is the largest hmRF with about two-thirds of its stores operated by franchsees. Moreover, this
does not mean chat Yum does not bear the same type of risk a company owned manufacturer.
For example, at the end of 2004 Yum Corporation a a s contingentl!. liable for lease payments
totaling $365 million. Addtionall!-, the company provided guarantees on loan pools to
franchisees of $16 million and various lettrrs of credit totaling $21 million during this same
period (Yum Corporation, p. 70). Thus. drect ownership is not a nccessa? condtion to bear
the risks of international expansion.
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An important consideration in this type of research is the dehition of a MNRF. There
is no single dehition of a multinational firm that is recognized within the f i n a n d literature.
Differing variables such as the nationality of management, the number of different counmes in
which h s do business and sales or profits have been used. When attempting to use either
sales or profits, sales are generally considered superior because of the smaller likelihood of
eamhgs manipulation.
Lee and Kwok (1988) address this issue by using the foreign tax ratio, or the percentage
of total taxes paid to foreign governments. In their research, Lee and Kwok used a wide variety
of firms to increase their sample size. Here, the research is limited to one pamcular industry, the
use of the foreign tax ratio severely limits the sample size available for analysis. In addition,
there is a possibiity of manipulation of the foreign tax ratio through use of transfer pricing and
other accounting techniques. Finally, we had to determine a cut-off point for foreign revenue as
a percentage of total revenue, to dassify the firm as foreign or not. Again there was no uniform
number used in the literature. Therefore, this study was begun using an arbitrary number (10%)
and said that if the firm has to derive at least ten percent or more ofits revenue from Foreign
sources it would be classified as a MNRF. Use of different levels of threshold amounts does not
m a t e d y change the results.
The capital stmcture of multinational firms is a relatively recent endeavor for capital
structure researchers. The common capital structure model according to Megginson (1997) is
shown:

VL = Vu

+ Tax Shield - Expected Bankruptcy Costs - Agency Costs

Where VL is the value of the levered firm and Vu is the value of the unlevered firm. As
shown in the equation, the value of the firm is increased by the present value of the tax shield of
the deductibility of interest payments and decreased by expected bankruptcy and agency costs.
We hypothesize that differences in expected bankruptcy costs and agency costs will have
an impact on the capital structure of MNRF's. Specifically, firms with higher costs are less likely
to have debt in their capital structures. O w research finds that MNRF's have hgher agency
costs, but bankruptcy costs are indeterminate. The overall effect in o w research is that there is a
positive relationship between MNRF's and total debt despite the increased agency costs.

Agency Costs, Bankruptcy Costs and Internationalization
Agency costs associated with debt
Research conducted by Myers (1977) hypothesizes that capital structure choice is related
to the agency costs of debt. Myers argues that firms ha7.e real options whose value is dependent
upon further discretionary investments. Examples of these investments include advertising and
research and development costs. If bondholders have a contract that matures after the
expiration of a real option, the benefits will accrue primarily to the bondholders. Myers refers
this as the underinvestment problem; where shareholders pass up projects with positive net
present values.
Bondholders, aware of this potential problem, take all of this into consideration.
Therefore, because of this underinvestment risk to the shareholders, bondholders will pay less
for the debt securities of the firm. This reduction in purchase price, paid by the bondholders,
represents an agency cost to the firm. The more a firm spends on research and advertising costs,
the higher the agency costs and the potential for underinvestment by the firm. These costs have
been used in previous research as proxies for agency costs by Lee and Kwok (1988) and Bradley,
Jarrel and Kim (1984).
Another agency cost to the firm is the substitution problem hypothesized by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). The owners of the firm will have an incentive to engage in risky project that
transfers wealth from bondholders to the shareholders. Speaficdy, the upside potential of the
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project accrues to the shareholders while an!- downside loss is borne more by the bondholders
than the shareholders. There are two h'pes of agency costs associated with t h s problem. The
frst cost is the reduction in price paid for the firm's bonds by bondholders (simidar to the
underinvestment prohiem). Secondly, because of the potential for a substitution problem,
bondholders nill most likely require bond covenants and monitoring of fum activities. These
activities represent real costs to the h . Thus, the low-er price paid for the bonds along with the
costs of bond covenants are all considered agency costs of debt.
The agency costs of debt can have a particular effect on the capital suucture o f h N R F ' s
as hypothesized by Kwok and Reeb (2000). They ar-pe that given the wider diversity of hINRF
operations, it takes greater effort to monitor the actions of a multinational firm. Therefore, this
would dscourage the use of deht. r\dditionally, the authors argue that that hlNRF's have more
real options, thereby bondholders are less &g
to pay the price for debt. Both of these points
support the notion that a MNRF would have less debt in its capital strucnue than a DRF.

Agency costs and the use of debt in hospitality firms
Capital structure research in hospitality is an emerging field. Sheel (1994) examines the
potential determinants of debt use by hotel and manufacturing firms. f i s research only includes
domestic 6rms and excludes restaurants. Gu (1995/96) attempts to test the pecking-order
theory of financing by using a sample of domestic lodging and m a n u f a c n ~ ~
h gs . Upneja and
Dalbor (2001) and Dalbor and Upneja (2002) examine the use of debt by domestic restaurant
firms and Gnd key determinants to be f m sue, age and fum risk (positive) and growth
opportunities (negative). Debt is used by larger and older f m s as an effective monitoring agent
to help reduce the agency costs associated with potential empire buildmy by management. O n
the other hand, restaurant h s ulth large growth opportunities may choose less debt because of
the peckng order as detined by Myers (2001).
Further research by Dalbor and Upneja (2004) hnd a positive relationship between
growth opportunities and total debr for domestic lodging h s . This is mfferent from restaurant
f m s as growth opportunities for lodgng h s can involve expansions, renovations or
acquisitions that have tangible value for lenden even in the case of Gnancial distress. Overall,
whde there has been capital structure research in the hospitality, none has covered or focused on
the behavior of multinational restaurant h s . Also, the results of previous studies indicate the
hospitahty i n d u s q may not he homogeneous in terms of capital strucrure choice.

Bankruptcy costs and debt
The relationship between the use of hnancial leverage and potential bankruptcy costs
has been ambiguous in the hterature. The first theory is parallel to using international
investments to reduce the variance in a portfolio. I s discussed by Shapito (1978), a company
developing overseas operations can reduce the rolatility of expected cash flows, subsequently
reducing the hkehhood of h a n h p t c y and its associated costs. .iccordingl!., a MNRF should use
more debt.
Kwok and Reeb (1998) develop an extension of the international &versification
hpothesis. The!- argue for an "upstream/downsneam" effect where less developed countries
represent increased risk, leading to the use of less deht by the intemadonal h . On the other
hand, expansion into a relatively dex-eloped country represents less risk, and \x-ould therefore lead
to the use of more debt. Therefore, the use of debt is dependent upon the condition of the
country into \\.hich operations are being expanded.
Another approach is taken by Khambata and Reeb (2000). A h m R F has operations in a
variety of international locations, subject ro a large variety of legal jurisdictions. \\Me holding
bankruptcy costs constant, the hrterogenciq of lenders' rules and regulations increases the costs
of potential bankruptq. Therefore, the authors argue that this would lead to a MNRF to use
less deht in the capital smlcrure.
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There seems to be a consensus in the recent capital structure literature regarding
internationalization and agency costs. Higher agency costs are assodated with
internationalization and therefore those firms should use less debt. But, there seems to he no
consensus on the effect of bankruptcy costs and debt in the multinational firm. Because of the
conflict between the diversification and upstream-downsaeam hypotheses, there is no a priori
expectation of a relationship between the use of debt and bankruptcy costs.
Empirical evidence from Lee and Kwok (1988) indicates that multinational firms do
have lugher agency costs than domestic firms. In terms of bankruptcy costs, the authors find
that multinational firms do not have lower bankruptcy costs than domestic firms after
controlling for firm size. Size is accounted for in their research by grouping the firms by amount
of assets and placing each firm in one of seven categories.
The authon also tested the multinational and domestic firms for debt ratios and found
that domestic h s have k h e r debt ratios. However, this was not true for all industries.
Domestic industries with lower debt ratios indude mining, textile, publishing and primary metals.
Moreover, the authors did not examine any hospitality firms such as hotels or restaurants.
Upneja and Dalbor (2001) examine the use of debt and expected bankruptcy costs for
domestic restaurant firms. While they find a positive relationship between firm risk and debt
use, this merely confirms the pecking order theory of Myers (1977) rather than address the
lugher potential bankruptcy costs for restaurant firms, whether they are DRF's or MNRF's.
While bankruptaes and their associated costs are lugh for small private domestic restaurant
firms, it remains an empirical question for publicly traded MNRF's.

Measurement of agency costs and expected bankruptcy costs
As previously discussed, a MNRF would be expected to have lugher agency costs.
Myers (1977) argues that research and development expenditures and advemsing expenditures
create Future opportunities for the firm that may or may not be utilized. Accordingly, the greater
the amount of expenditures, the greater the potential for underinvestment by the owners and
thus, lugher agency costs.
Lee and Kwok (1988) use the percentage of sales represented by advemsing and
research and development costs as proxies for agency costs. This had also been used in other
studies including Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984). We use a similar measure, although we do not
expect a large amount of research and development expenditures in our sample.
As argued by Lee and Kwok (1988), bankruptcy costs can generally be expected to
remain constant. Therefore, expected bankruptcy costs are largely a factor of the probability of
bankruptcy. Although Lee and Kwok use the variability of cash flows as a measure of this, we
have decided to use Ohlson's Revised O Score as used by Dalbor and Upneja (2002). This score
makes use of number of key ratios to effectively predict bankruptcy and has been used in other
hospitality capital structure research (Upneja and Dalbor, 1999).

Hypotheses to be tested
Based on the established theory, we propose two alternative hypotheses:

HI: There is a positive relationship between agency costs and MNRF's.
HZ: There is a positive relationship between bankruptcy costs and MNRF's.
If the tirst hypothesis were correct, then this would appear to indicate that MNRF's
would use less debt. On the other hand, if MNRF's have lower expected bankruptcy costs, this
would indicate that they would use more debt. Since these two elements are in contradiction, it
is uncertain which factor has greater influence on the overall debt in the capital structure of the
firms in the sample. Accordingly, we propose a third altemative hypothesis to assess the
relationship between total debt and MNRF's.
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H3: There is a negative relationshp between total debt and IvINRF's
We were prepared, ~n fact, that the results could indcate an opposlte effect dependmg
on the balance of agency costs of debt and expected b a n h p t c ) coqts.

Methodology - Data sample
The sample ofrestaurant € i s is from the COhlPCSTAITdatabase for the years 1980
e
period.
through 2004. \Ye excluded from our analysis f m s that did not have data for d ~ entire
e
was selective, based on the regression model. Only those f m s were
However, d ~ exclusion
excluded for each model that did not have the required data for that model. For example, the
variables required in the first regression are agency costs, size, and an indicator variable for
multinational character of the f m . Note that the Ohlson's revised 0-score is used on17 in the
second regression model, therefore obsen-ations were not excluded if they d d not have the
required information to calculate the Ohlson's 0-score. Therefore, the exclusion for the first
model was based onlj- on the three variables required for the first model. In the second model,
we excluded based on the requirements of the second model. The number of obsen.ations for
each model varied from 38 to 90. Summa? statistics of the data are provided in Table 1 and a
correlation matrix is shown in Table 2.

Table 1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis.

SIZE
XKRF

101
101

2.000
0.406

1.420
0.491

0
0

4
1

The table lists the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the
regression analyses

Terms used:
AC: agency costs of the Grm represented by the ratio of advertising and research and
development costs to total sales.
DR: total debt ratio and is defined as the total debt of the &I (both long and short
term) dvided b>-total assets.
OR: Oldson's revised 0 score, a mcasure between 0 and I inlcating die probabhty of
bankruptcy (1 is the highest probabilin-).
SIZE: categorical rariablc with the frms divided into five categories based upon the
log of the number of total assets. 1 is the largest firm while 5 is the smallest fum.
hlNRF: an inlcator variable where 1 is a multinauonal restaurant frm.
Because the number of obsen-ations varied between the three models, the correlation
ma& is shown in three panels in table 2. Each panel corresponds to each of the three
regression models.
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix by Regression Models*
Panel A: Correlation matrix for first re esslon model AC = Size + MNW
Variable
0.13
MNRF

ize + MNRF

Panel B: Co

Panel C: C

*Because there were different numbers of observations in each model
resulting in different values for correlations between the same variables, we
deaded to show the correlation ma& separately for each model.

Terms used:
AC: agency costs of the h represented by the ratio of advertising and research and
development costs to total sales.
DR: total debt ratio and is defined as the total debt of the h (both long and short
term) divided by total assets.
OR: Ohlson's revised 0 score, a measure between 0 and 1 indicating the probability of
bankruptcy (I is the hghest probability).
SIZE: categorical variable with the fums divided into five categories based upon the
log of the number of total assets. 1 is the largest h while 5 is the smallest h.
MNRF: an indicator variable where 1 is a multinational restaurant firm.

Methodology - linear models
Our methodology uses general linear models to invesdgate the relationship between
agency costs, expected bankn~ptcycosts and debt ratios and MNRF's. We considered a h that
has more than 10 percent of its sales From international sources to be a MNRF. Additionally, to
alleviate any size bias, we placed the h s into 5 different categories based upon the number of
assets under thek control. The largest h was a 1 and the smallest is given a 5. This is
consistent with Lee and Kwok (1988). Accordingly, the three linear models are as follows:
AC=a,,+alSIZE+a2MNRF+ ei.
OOR=ao+alSIZE+azMNRF+

~

i

.

DR=a,,+alSIZE+azMNRF+ ei.
Where:
AC = the ratio of advertising and r&d expenditures to total sales
OOR = Revised Ohlson's 0 score, a predictor of b a n h p t c y and an indicator of expected
bankruptcy costs
DR= the ratio of total debt to total assets
SIZE = indicator variable based upon total assets
MNRF = variable indicating if the iirm is multinational
q = the error terms of the model.
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Results
The regression results are- shown in Table 3. Thc table reports rrgression results for the
three regresslon models.

Table 3: Regression Analysis Results

I Dependent I

1
I

Repession
1

2
3

*

I
I

~ariablr

AC
OOR
DR

I
1

Intercept
0.03
(5.55)0.38
(8.86)-'
0.55
(12.97)'-

1
I
I

SIZE
-11.01
(-I 0')
.16
(-jll).'

0.05
(~1.99).

1
I
I

hLKRF
0.03
12.46)'*
.17
(1.71)
0.25
(3.27)"

1
I
1

( .idj.R2
F*
1.'3*

1

I

("d,

6.88

15.14"

42.67

5.61**

9.29

Significant at p < .05.

Terms used:
AC: agency costs of the firm represented by the ratio of advertising and research
and development costs to total sales.
DR: total debt ratio and is detined as the total debt of the firm (both long and short
term) dmided by total assets.
OR: Ohlson's revised O score, a measure between 0 and I indtcating the
probabdiq of b a n h p t q (1 is the hlghest p r t ~ b a b i h ~ ) .
SIZE: categorical rariable with the Grms divided into five categories based upon
the log of the number of total assets. 1 is the largest firm while 5 is the
smallest t i i .
M N W an indicator rariable where 1 is a multinational restaurant f i m .
The f i s t regression shows the results with agent!- costs as the dependent variable. r\fter
taking into consideration the size o f the f i r , there is a sipticant and positive rrladonshp
between hINRF's and agency costs. This result c o n f i s previous research with other f m s .
indicating that more costs have to be iticurred to reduce the information as!.mmem regardmg
the firmas it expands mternationall~.
The second regression sho\\~sthe rrlationship between hliVRF's and espected
bankruptcy costs as operationalized by the revised Ohlson's 0 Score variable. The predicted
sign of the MNRF variable was indeterminate a prioi because of tbc relative importance of
exactly where a firm was going to expand overseas. But after taking size into consideration, the
result supports the notion that risky f i s take on more debt ox-eraU as found by Dalbor and
Upneja (2004) for domestic restaurant firms.
The final regression shou~sthe relationslup brtween La'RF's and total debt. Given tlre
higher agency and b a n h p t costs
~
shown in the f i s t two regressions, we espected to find a
negative relationshp between hCNRF's and total debt. Insrcad, we find a significant and positive
relationslup between hfNRF's and total debt.

This unexpected result could be for a number of reasons:
The MNRF's ma>-be more "mature" than cxzecred. thus they may have less growth
opportunities and accordmg to hlyers' (1977) pecking order theor). of financing,
would use more debt.
We have used total debt as a dependent variable, which could include a substanaal
amount of short-term debt, u,lnch is easier to re-tinance.
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MNRF's may have more locations that are actually owned instead of leased. Real
estate ownership would seem to imply greater use of debt that is secured by valuable
tangible assets such as land and building.
It should be noted that we ran other regression models using different measures for total
debt. We ran a regression with total current liabilities as the dependent variable and another
model with long-term debt as the dependent variable. Both regressions indicated a significant
and positive relationship with MNRF's and the measure of debt continning the results of our
otiginal model.

Conclusions and Implications for Further Research
This research examines the relationship between agency costs and expected bankruptcy
costs and MNRF's. Our 6rst result supports the existing literature that states that these types of
firms should incur higher agency costs. Our bankruptcy cost model has borderhe significance,
but the sign of this coeffiaent was indeterminate because of the dependence upon the location
of foreign expansion. Additionally, we find that MNRF's use more total deb\ a result that was
unexpected.
The results generated by this research warrant further investigation. Overall, operational
characteristics of MNRF's should be examined in greater detail to understand the similarities and
differences as compared to domestic fums. Additionally, agency costs in general, and for the
restaurant industty in particular, need to be better dehned. Moreover, more research should be
conducted as to the appropriate definition of a multinational restaurant firm. There is no current
consensus on this issue an4 unfortunately, a consensus may not be forthcoming anytime soon.
The research hghl~ghtsthe very fluid siruation confronting research into mu&-national
activities. Firms are s d experimenting with investment structures and there are still surprises
when doing research in this area.
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Appendix
The revised 0-score (probability) of bankruptcy is calculated in the following manner:
First, we calculate the numerical value
of the probability of bankruptcy. The second step is
to calculate the 0-score that represents the probability of bankruptcy.

The revised 0-Score ranges from 0 (exaemely low probability of bankruptcy) to 1 (indicutinz a
iW%pmbabi/io a/bankmptg). The procedure for calculating the revised 0-score is based on the
equation below.
Revised 0 Score = 1/(1 + e~N9
An explanation of the variables is shown below.
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